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Abstract 
Compensatory control theory proposes that individuals can assuage threatened personal 
control by endorsing external systems or agents that provide a sense that the world is 
meaningfully ordered. Recent research drawing on this perspective finds that one means by 
which individuals can compensate for a loss of control is adherence to ideological beliefs 
about the social world. This prior work, however, has largely neglected the role of social 
groups in defining either the nature of control threat or the means by which individuals 
compensate for these threats. In four experiments (N = 466) we test the possibility that group-
based threats to personal control can be effectively managed by defensively identifying with 
the threatened group and its values. We provide evidence for the specificity of these effects 
by demonstrating that defensive identification and ideology endorsement are specific to the 
content of the group-based threat.  
 
Keywords: social identity, ideology, personal control, compensatory control, social mobility, 
national identification, meritocracy, egalitarianism 
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Group identity as a source of threat and means of compensation: Establishing personal 
control through group identification and ideology  
People generally expect they will be able to influence the world around them and 
thereby achieve desired outcomes (e.g., efficacy; Bandura, 1977). By perceiving themselves 
as having personal control, people are able to maintain a sense that the social world is well-
ordered and predictable. Despite the importance of perceived personal control for positive 
psychological functioning (Kay, Sullivan, & Landau, 2014), these perceptions are occasionally 
challenged by chaotic or uncontrollable events. How do individuals manage these threats? 
Research commonly finds that when perceptions of personal control are threatened, people 
use external sources of order to compensate. As we review in detail below, researchers have 
found that individuals can turn to a wide range of targets capable of providing a feeling that 
the world is orderly and predictable. 
Although research on how individuals compensate for threats to personal control has 
explored the possibility that social groups can serve as one source of compensation, it has not 
investigated the possibility that threats to control may result from membership in a social 
group nor how individuals might assuage these group-based threats to control. We investigate 
the extent to which certain ideological beliefs allow individuals to compensate for threats to 
control based upon being a member of a social group. We argue that when personal control is 
threatened as a result of membership in a valued social group, social identification processes 
can influence the selection, or rejection, of specific ideological sources for compensation as 
means of reaffirming perceived personal control. 
Ideology and Compensatory Control 
We define ideology as an interrelated set of values and beliefs about the structure of 
society that constitute a group’s shared perspective (Geertz, 1966; Remington, 1971). For 
example, shared ideologies on the efficiency of the “free market” can help people understand 
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and rationalize the current social structure (Thorisdottir, Jost, & Kay, 2009). Likewise, shared 
beliefs about social injustice among subordinate group members may promote interpretations 
of the social world that challenge the legitimacy of current social order (Haslam & Reicher, 
2013; Mannheim, 1936). Whether ideology is employed to defend or challenge the status 
quo, ideologies offer group members a clear and structured understanding of the social world 
from their group’s perspective. By doing so, ideologies help affirm that the social system is 
ordered and consistent rather than chaotic and unpredictable.  
The idea that people need to see the social world as orderly has received renewed 
attention in psychology. Compensatory control theory (CCT) argues that individuals strive to 
perceive personal control over their environment as a means of meeting the greater goal of 
believing their world is meaningfully structured (Kay, Sullivan, & Landau, 2014). CCT 
proposes that one way individuals can reestablish perception of stability following a threat to 
their control is to align themselves with external agents of order and predictability. By 
reaffirming their belief that the external source of order has things well in hand, the 
individual is able to assuage the threat to their own control (Kay et al., 2008; Kay & Eibach, 
2013; Kay, Sullivan, & Landau, 2014). Research from a CCT perspective has found 
substantial evidence in favor of this claim. For example, participants who suffered a threat to 
their personal control strongly endorsed the belief that God actively controls aspects of their 
lives, but parallel effects were not observed for other beliefs about God (e.g., the belief that 
God created the world; Kay et al., 2008). Additional studies have shown that threats to 
personal control result in greater adherence to governmental control (Kay et al., 2008), a 
national culture focused on law and order (Shepherd, Kay, Landau, & Keefer, 2011), belief in 
conspiracy theories (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), faith in ordered origins of life theories (i.e., 
ordered evolution or ordered intelligent design; Rutjens, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 
2010), and belief in the existence and power of one’s enemies (Sullivan, Landau, & 
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Rothschild, 2010). Additionally, and important to our argument, research from this 
perspective has also found that when an individual’s personal control is threatened, 
ideological beliefs can also operate as a means of reestablishing a sense that their 
environment is meaningfully ordered (Goode, Keefer, & Molina, 2014; Kay & Eibach, 2013). 
What unites these diverse findings is the central idea that when individuals feel that they lack 
control over their own lives, they can manage that threat by perceiving a meaningful ordering 
or pattern in the social world around them.  
While research on CCT demonstrates that external social systems are appealing when 
personal control is lacking, it has relied on a strict dichotomy between the personal and the 
external. For example, many studies rely on a written threat induction that primes participants 
with personal experiences of a lack of control before measuring endorsement of external 
systems (e.g., Kay et al., 2008). However, there are many important contexts in which control 
threats cross these levels, blurring this prior theoretical boundary. In particular, we address 
the possibility that individuals may experience threats to personal control as a result of their 
membership in certain social groups. In such cases, group identity may be both a source of 
control threat and a means of assuaging that threat by offering ideologies that can provide a 
sense of social order. To explore this possibility, we turn to social identity theory (SIT), one 
of the most well-established perspectives on the psychology of groups. Specifically, we 
propose that when threats to personal control are based upon group membership, social 
identification processes will influence which external sources of compensation (e.g., 
ideology) are selected or rejected by the individual. 
Social Identity Theory 
Identity (i.e., who an individual understands themselves to be) is a combination of 
both personal aspects (such as one’s traits) and social aspects (such as one’s profession). 
Social identity is the part of identity derived specifically from the social groups people find 
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meaningful (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1999). Rather than seeing these groups as simply 
a collection of people, social identity theory (SIT) argues that group memberships are 
psychologically meaningful identities that help define an individual’s sense of self (Haslam, 
Ellemers, Reicher, Reynolds, & Schmitt, 2010).  
 Self-categorization theory (SCT) builds upon SIT to propose that as individuals 
navigate their social environment, they can think about themselves (i.e., self-categorize) as an 
individual person or as a member of a group. When the individual categorizes at the group 
level, they begin to think and behave as they believe a “typical” group member should. The 
group identity the person aligns with then becomes a filter for how they perceive and 
structure their interactions (Turner & Oakes, 1997).  
  Group identity and norms. When individuals identify with a group, the norms and 
values representing a group’s accepted beliefs, emotions and behaviors (Hogg & Reid, 2006) 
are often internalized. For example, attitudes that bring the individual closer to enacting the 
group’s prototype are more strongly endorsed (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & 
Turner, 1990). One could imagine a new employee trying to fit into a new workplace by 
strongly endorsing shared values or beliefs among their co-workers (such as the company’s 
mission statement). Self-categorization at the group level generates both a feeling of 
belonging and identification with others who share that group membership; as a result the 
individual thinks and feels in ways that are consistent with the group prototype. Because 
group prototypes are reflections of the group’s perspective on social reality, those prototypes 
become the norms for how group members ought to act, feel and think in a given context 
(Hogg & Reid, 2006).   
Group identity and ideology. The uncertainty-identity perspective has shown that 
increased identification with a social group leads to greater acceptance of the group’s 
ideological beliefs and actions (i.e., authoritarianism; protests; Hogg, Meehan, & 
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Farquharson, 2010). For example, among highly identified Palestinians, more extremist 
ideological beliefs and behaviors pertaining to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict (i.e., use of 
suicide bombings to attack Israelis) were endorsed compared to those lower in identification. 
Likewise, Israeli participants who highly identify with their national group more strongly 
endorsed use of strong military tactics to combat the Palestinian forces. Individuals from both 
of these groups aligned themselves with greater adherence to ideological beliefs (held by a 
subset of the larger Palestinian and Israeli population) and support for actions reflecting their 
ideological stance (Hogg & Adelman, 2013). 
Thus, research on social identity shows that the groups with which people identify 
influence the acceptance and expression of group normative beliefs and behaviors. When an 
individual heightens their identification with a social group, they interpret and interact with 
their social environment as they believe a group member would and should (Turner & Oakes, 
1997). Yet what happens when an individual experiences a threat to their personal control 
based upon their group? Do they maintain adherence to their group’s norms and beliefs or do 
they select any compensation source that is available to them? 
Threats to the Self due to Social Group Membership 
Prior research has demonstrated that group-based threats commonly elicit group-
based responses. For example, research typically finds that members increase their level of 
group commitment if the group’s value is threatened. For instance, researchers found that 
threat (vs. affirmation) of a group’s status resulted in higher group identification (Turner, 
Hogg, Turner, & Smith, 1984). Research on the rejection-identification model (Branscombe, 
Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001) has shown that that 
perceived prejudice, a threat to the value of one’s group, similarly increases group 
identification. While perceived prejudice was found to have a direct negative effect on 
participant’s personal well-being, the indirect effect of prejudice on personal well-being 
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through group identification was positive: Participants were able to assuage or compensate 
for a group-based threat to their well-being by increasing their group identification. 
Interestingly, individuals were able to compensate through group identification even though 
the threat to their well-being was based upon their group membership. These results suggest 
that group-based threats might affect group members at the personal level (i.e., personal 
wellbeing), yet at the same time promote greater group identification as a means of coping 
with that threat.  
Based upon this work we predicted that a group-based threat to control could also 
affect individual group member perceived personal control, while at the same time promoting 
identification with that social group. This idea sheds light on a spectrum of threats to personal 
control that have gone neglected thus far in research on compensatory control. For example, 
members of devalued social groups often experience discrimination based on their group 
membership, a likely threat to the individual’s sense of control over their personal outcomes. 
Likewise, national groups face threats from foreign aggression, a likely threat to the 
individual group member’s sense of control over their safety. These examples illustrate that 
the dynamics of control threat and compensation must acknowledge the role of social groups, 
which can be both a source of threat and a means of compensation.  
Overview of Current Studies 
We predicted that individuals would respond to group-based threats to personal 
control primarily by increasing their identification with the group implicated in that threat. 
This prediction follows directly from the research reviewed above showing that individuals 
commonly respond to group-based threats with increased identification with the threatened 
group.  
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Prior research on CCT and SIT converge on an additional prediction: increased 
identification with a social group is likely to lead to subsequent endorsement of ideologies 
prototypical of that group. Following CCT, we would expect this to occur because these 
ideologies provide a sense that the social world is meaningfully ordered (i.e., they 
compensate for lost personal control). Following SIT and SCT, we expect that group-based 
threats to control will increase ideology endorsement specifically as a function of increased 
identification because ideologies are group normative beliefs and identification often 
increases adherence to group norms. 
Across four studies we tested this mediational hypothesis using the social group 
Americans and the group normative ideology meritocracy (which, as noted, effectively serves 
as a source of compensatory control; Goode et al., 2014). As an ideology, meritocracy offers 
a structured understanding of both success and failure in the economic sphere as the 
overarching economic system of distribution recognizes and rewards the merit of the 
successful individual while withholding undeserved rewards from those who have not yet 
earned them (Hochschild, 1995; Jackman, 1994; Kluegel & Smith, 1986).  
Meritocracy is a normative ideology, given the majority of Americans believe in hard 
work as a primary tactic for economic success (PEW, 2012) and believe that the American 
economic system rewards merit (Hochschild, 1995). Despite the historical and current 
differences in the accessibility of opportunities across group lines, meritocracy has been a 
central ideology in most definitions of American beliefs and values (Feldman, 1983; Lipset, 
1979). Thus, we use endorsement of meritocracy to operationally represent an ideology that 
is normative for a specific group (i.e., Americans).  
 In four studies we tested whether a group-based threat to personal control would: a) 
reduce individual perceptions of personal control; b) promote higher levels of group 
identification; c) promote greater adherence to a group normative ideology (i.e., meritocracy); 
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and d) following a group-based threat to control, compensation through identification and 
ideology would enable participants to reaffirm their personal control.  
One goal of the present studies was to disentangle the specific effects of group-based 
control threat from other related group-based threats or threat-responses. As noted above, 
when self-certainty is lowered, people can reestablish certainty through ingroup identification 
and group-normative ideological beliefs. Similarly, threats to a group’s value can lower 
collective self-esteem and motivate group members to show greater ingroup bias 
(Branscombe & Wann, 1994). Thus, a group-based control threat may increase identification 
through a loss of self-certainty or collective self-esteem rather than personal control. 
Our account also suggests specificity with respect to how people compensate for a 
group-based control threat. Based on prior research, we anticipated that a group-based threat 
would be met by a group-based response. That is, if a control threat is based on a particular 
group, then identification with that group specifically (but not other social groups) should 
increase. Further, because ideology endorsement is a result of increased identification, we 
expected that participants should become more supportive of group normative (vs. non-
normative) ideologies. Study 3 offers a test of both of these claims within one experimental 
design. 
 Lastly, drawing on CCT, we expected that identification and subsequent ideology 
endorsement would effectively restore perceptions of personal control, given that ideologies 
provide a sense that the world is ordered. In Study 3, we assessed personal control as an 
outcome of the process identified above. Specifically, we predicted that a group-based control 
threat would increase ideology endorsement as a function of greater group identification and 
that increased feelings of personal control would be the result of that specific process. We test 
this full model in Study 3. 
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Study 1a 
 Study 1a tested whether group-based threats to control affect group members’ 
perceived personal control. As a manipulation, we provided some participants with 
information that their group (Americans) has had a decrease (vs. an increase vs. a stable rate) 
in economic opportunities over time. The goal of the manipulation was to threaten 
participants’ sense of control over their economic future because of the group they belong to. 
We subsequently assessed participant’s perceptions of personal (i.e., individual) control.  
Method 
 Participants. One-hundred twenty-six residents of the United States (U.S.) 
participated via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online service for a small financial incentive 
($0.40). Two participants (2 men) were excluded from analysis due to their failure to 
complete over 50% of the study materials. The final sample (N = 124; 52 women) ranged in 
age from 19 to 69 (M = 30.83, SD = 10.23). When asked to indicate their ethnicity, 76.6% 
self-categorized as White; 12.1% as Asian; 5.6% as Black; 4.8% as Latino(a); and 0.8% did 
not indicate their ethnicity.  
 Group-based threat to personal control. Participants were randomly assigned to 
view one of three fabricated reports ostensibly from the United States (U.S.) Department of 
Labor describing individual economic mobility rates for American citizens over 3 decades 
(1980 - 2010). In the group-based control threat condition participants saw a graph showing 
rates of opportunities to make more money than previous generations as decreasing over the 
last thirty years. The accompanying text emphasized that over time Americans have had 
fewer opportunities for success and, as a result, they have less control over their economic 
outcomes.  
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 Participants in the group-based control affirmation condition participants saw a graph 
showing rates of opportunities to make more money than previous generations as increasing 
over the last thirty years. The accompanying text emphasized that over time Americans have 
enjoyed greater opportunities for success and, as a result, they have more control over their 
economic outcomes. The graphs in both conditions illustrated the same rate of change over 
time (positively or negatively). 
 Participants in the neutral condition saw a graph showing only minor fluctuations (up 
and down) in the rates of opportunities to make more money than previous generations over 
the last 30 years. This graph gave the impression that rates had remained stable over time 
(and indeed the graph begins in 1980 and ends in 2010 at the same level). The accompanying 
text emphasized that Americans have had relatively stable rates of opportunity for success 
over time.  
 Perceived personal control. To assess perceptions of personal control, we asked 
participants to rate their agreement with 6 items modified from the Mastery Scale (Pearlin et 
al., 1981): “I feel that I have a great degree of control over what happens to me in my life;” “I 
feel a high sense of personal control over my life;” “I often feel helpless in dealing with the 
problems of life” (reverse scored). Participants rated their agreement with these (and all 
subsequent) statements using a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree). 
These items formed a reliable composite (α = .84) and scores were averaged.  
Results and Discussion 
 We conducted a one-way ANOVA on perceived personal control (Mgrand = 4.68, 
SDgrand = 1.07) to examine the impact of our experimental manipulation. Analysis indicated a 
significant main effect of condition, F(2, 121) = 6.97, p = .001, η² = .10, with participants in 
the group-based control threat condition indicating lower perceived personal control (M = 
4.20, SD = 1.11) compared to participants in the group-based control affirmation condition 
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(M = 4.93, SD = 1.06, p = .002) and participants in the neutral condition (M = 4.92, SD = .88, 
p = .002). The latter two conditions did not differ (p = .97).   
 Study 1a showed that information threatening group-based control decreased 
participants’ perceptions of personal control. Specifically, participants who received 
information showing declining (vs. increasing or stable) opportunities for Americans 
perceived themselves as having less personal control. However this study does not rule out 
alternative effects of our prime. It is possible that our prime also affects self-certainty and/or 
collective self-esteem, two constructs closely related to identity (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; 
Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; Turner, Hogg, Turner, & Smith, 1984) and ideological beliefs 
(Hogg, Meehan, & Farquharson, 2010).  
Study 1b 
 Study 1b was designed to verify that our group-based threat prime impacts perceived 
personal control without altering perceptions of self-certainty or collective self-esteem. Using 
the experimental primes for the group-based control threat and neutral conditions
1
 from 
Study 1a, we presented participants with measures of personal control, self-certainty, and 
collective self-esteem (with order of the measures randomized), and then assessed degree of 
national identification. We expected the group-based control threat to impact perceived 
personal control but not self-certainty or collective self-esteem. Furthermore, we expected 
decreased perceived personal control to mediate the effect of the group-based control threat 
on increased national identification.  
Method 
 Participants. One-hundred forty (67 women) residents of the U.S. were recruited for 
participation via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online service for a small financial incentive 
($0.40). Nine participants (5 women, 4 men) were excluded from analysis due to their failure 
                                                 
1 
 We only used the threat and neutral conditions from Study 1a in order to preserve power to test the 
discriminant validity of our manipulation’s effect on our dependent variables. 
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to complete over 50% of the study materials. The final sample (N = 131) ranged in age from 
19 to 70 (M = 34.32, SD = 11.31). When asked to indicate their ethnicity, 77.5% self-
categorized as White; 9.3% as Black; 6.2% as Asian; 5.4% as Latino(a); and 1.6% did not 
indicate their ethnicity.  
 Group-based threat to personal control. Participants were randomly assigned to 
view either the group-based control threat or the neutral priming materials from Study1a.  
 Perceived personal control. Personal control was assessed using the same items 
from Study 1a (α =.78).  
 Self-certainty. Self-certainty was measured using 6 items (Hohman & Hogg, 2015). 
For example; “I have a clear understanding of my personality;” “I know my place in the 
world;” and “I am uncertain about what my future holds (R).” These items formed a reliable 
measure of self-certainty (α = .73).  
 Collective self-esteem. Collective self-esteem was measured using 4 items modified 
from the Public subscale of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). 
Items included; “Overall, America is considered good by others;” “Most people consider 
America, on average, to be more ineffective than other countries (R);” “In general, others 
respect America;” and “In general, others think that America is unworthy (R).” These items 
formed a reliable composite (α = .79) and scores were averaged. 
 National Identification. National identification was measured using 4 items modified 
from the patriotism subscale of the national attachment measure (Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, 
& Pratto, 1997): “I often think of myself as a member of America;” “Being American is 
important to me;” "I am proud to be an American;” and “I find the sight of the American flag 
very moving.” These items formed a reliable scale (α = .79) and scores were averaged.  
Results and Discussion 
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 See Table 1 for descriptives and correlations between variables. A one-way ANOVA 
was performed to determine the impact of condition on perceived personal control, self-
certainty, and collective self-esteem. Analysis revealed a significant effect of condition on 
personal control, F(1, 129) = 5.03, p = .02, η² = .04, with participants in the group-based 
control threat condition indicating less perceived personal control (M = 5.07, SD = 0.93) than 
participants in the neutral condition (M = 5.42, SD = 0.77). Analysis revealed no significant 
effect of condition on self-certainty, F(1, 129) = 0.592, p = .44; participants in the group-
based control threat condition (M = 5.32, SD = 0.99) indicated similar levels of self-certainty 
as participants in the neutral condition (M = 5.20, SD = 0.90). Likewise, analysis revealed no 
significant effect of condition on collective self-esteem, F(1, 129) = 0.575, p = .45; 
participants in the group-based control threat condition (M = 4.33, SD = 1.14) indicated 
similar levels of collective self-esteem as participants in the neutral condition (M = 4.48, SD 
= 1.12).  
 We conducted a one-way ANOVA to investigate the effect of experimental condition 
on level of national identification. Analysis revealed a significant effect of condition, F(1, 
129) = 4.44, p = .03, η² = .03, with participants in the group-based control threat condition 
(M = 4.66, SD = 1.30) reporting higher national identification than participants in the neutral 
condition (M = 4.18, SD = 1.28). 
Indirect Effects 
 We then tested whether higher levels of national identification in the group-based 
control threat condition could be accounted for by decreased perceived control. Using model 
4 of the Process macro for SPSS (ten-thousand bootstrapped resamples; Hayes, 2013), we 
regressed national identification onto experimental condition (dummy coded:  0 = neutral and 
1 = group-based control threat) and entered perceived personal control as the proposed 
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mediator. Contrary to our expectations, the model was not significant, indirect effect = -0.12, 
SE = 0.17 [-0.45, 0.21] 
 Study 1b provided partial evidence for our predictions. On one hand, our group-based 
threat to personal control decreased perceived personal control without affecting participant’s 
perceptions of self-certainty or collective self-esteem. Replicating the effects of Study1a, we 
found that those who read about declining rates of opportunity in America felt less personal 
control than those who read about stable rates of opportunity. On the other hand, Study 1b did 
not provide evidence that a loss of personal control directly accounted for the effect of our 
prime on national identification. We found that the group-based control threat decreased 
personal control and increased national identification, however mediational analysis did not 
support our contention that an increase in identification following our group-based threat was 
specifically due to a loss of personal control and we discuss this issue in greater detail in the 
General Discussion.   
Study 2 
 In Study 2 we sought to extend our observed effects of a group-based threat on 
personal control and national identity. We expected that a group-based control threat would 
increase group identification and that group-based threat would increase adherence to a 
group-normative ideology as a way of compensating for this threat. Finally we expected that 
increased support for ideology would be due in part to greater group identification. To test the 
hypothesized direction of effects, we included all experimental conditions used in Study 1a.  
Method 
 Participants. All participants successfully completed the study materials and the final 
sample included 90 (39 women) U.S. residents. Participants accessed the study through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and they received a small financial incentive ($0.40). The sample 
ranged in age from 19 to 68 (M = 35.42, SD = 13.84). When asked to indicate their ethnicity, 
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77.8% self-categorized as White; 12.2% as Asian; 4.4% as Black; 3.3% as Latino(a); and 
2.3% did not indicate ethnicity. 
 Group-based control threat. Participants were randomly assigned to either the 
group-based control threat, group-based control affirmation, or neutral conditions used in 
Study 1a.   
 We added one item to ensure comprehension of the article. Specifically, participants 
were asked to correctly identify the direction of individual mobility rates in the graph they 
saw during the prime. They were asked to choose from four options; “going up,” “going 
down,” “staying the same” or “I don’t remember.” Analysis indicated that the majority of 
participants (92%; N = 83) correctly identified the graph trend in their condition, χ²(4) = 
142.32, p < .001. All participants were included in the following analyses as excluding the 7 
who failed the manipulation check did not alter the pattern or significance of the results 
reported below. 
Measures 
National identification. We used the same four-item measure of national 
identification as in Study 1b. These items were averaged and again formed a reliable measure 
of national identification (α = .87).  
Meritocracy. Six items were modified from the capitalist values scale (McClosky & 
Zaller, 1984) to measure meritocracy endorsement. For example, “Anyone who is willing to 
work hard has a good chance of succeeding”; “If people work hard enough they can make a 
good life for themselves”; “Hard work offers little guarantee of success” (reverse scored). 
These items were averaged and formed a reliable measure (α = .85). 
Results 
 A one-way ANOVA was conducted to investigate the impact of condition on national 
identification (Mgrand = 4.71, SDgrand = 1.22). Analysis revealed a significant effect, F(2, 87) = 
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3.20, p = .04, η² = .12, with participants in the group-based control threat condition reporting 
higher levels of national identification (M = 5.20, SD = 1.05) than participants in the group-
based control affirmation condition (M = 4.47, SD = 1.18, p = .02) or participants in the 
neutral condition (M = 4.54, SD = 1.29, p = .03). The latter two conditions did not differ (p = 
.81).   
 We next conducted a one-way ANOVA on meritocracy scores (Mgrand = 4.15, SDgrand 
= 1.19) to determine the impact of condition. Analysis indicated a significant effect, F(2, 87) 
= 6.33, p = .00, η² = .13, with participants in the group-based control threat condition 
endorsing meritocracy significantly more (M = 4.81, SD = 1.19) than individuals in the 
group-based control affirmation condition (M = 3.91, SD = 1.23, p = .003) or those in the 
neutral condition (M = 3.85, SD = .95, p = .002). The latter two conditions did not differ (p = 
.83).  
Indirect Effects 
 We then tested whether higher levels of national identification in the group-based 
control threat condition accounted for higher levels of meritocracy endorsement. Using 
model 4 of the Process macro for SPSS (ten-thousand bootstrapped resamples; Hayes, 2013), 
we regressed meritocracy onto experimental condition (dummy coded:  0 = group-based 
control affirmation/neutral and 1 = group-based control threat) and entered national 
identification as the proposed mediator. As seen in Figure 2, the group-based threat to control 
increased national identification, which in turn increased meritocracy endorsement, indirect 
effect = 0.21, SE = 0.11, 95% CI = (.05, .49).
2
  
Study 2 Discussion 
                                                 
2 
 Testing an alternative model with meritocracy as a proposed mediator for the effect of condition on 
national identification also produced a significant result, indirect effect = 0.30, SE = 0.14, 95% CI = .08, .66. 
 Testing separate mediation models comparing our group-based control threat condition to both the 
group-based control affirmation and the neutral conditions separately also yielded significant models, indirect 
effect = 0.17, SE = 0.09, 95% CI = .04, .41 and indirect effect = 0.19, SE = 0.094, 95% CI = .05, .32, 
respectively. We report the collapsed comparison for simplicity.  
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 Study 2 showed that when participants experienced a drop in their perceived control 
as a result of a group-based threat, they responded with greater identification with their 
national group and greater endorsement of a shared group ideology. Furthermore, increased 
group identification mediated the effect of the threat on meritocracy endorsement.  
 However, the results of Study 2 cannot address several alternatives. First, the 
mediation model, while statistically significant, cannot rule out the possibility that it is 
actually ideological endorsement that mediates the effect of threat on social identity. Due to 
the significance of the alternative model, it is plausible that a group-based threat to control 
increases ideological endorsement, and that ideological endorsement in turn increases group 
identification. Fritz and MacKinnon’s (2007) guidelines (and the results of Study 2) suggest a 
sample larger than 115 would be needed to accurately test our proposed mediation model. 
Therefore to directly assess this alternative theoretical argument, in Study 3 we increased our 
sample size to 121 participants so as to have sufficient statistical power to allow for an 
accurate test of both mediation models simultaneously. 
Secondly, it is possible that individuals might increase identification with any group 
in response to loss of personal control. Prior research supports the idea that individuals can 
find a sense of control through identification with various valued social groups (Greenaway 
et al., 2015), so it is possible that participants could identify with any group after a threat to 
personal control. In contrast, we predict that a threat to control based on a person’s 
membership in a specific group (in this case, Americans) will uniquely increase identification 
with that group rather than any group available to them (e.g., religious groups).  
 Third, we maintain that meritocracy endorsement is specifically due to increased 
identification with the group Americans, although previous studies cannot rule out the 
possibility that meritocracy endorsement could be elicited by identification with other groups 
as well. To provide discriminant validity for our group-specific ideology model, it is crucial 
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to demonstrate that compensatory endorsement of meritocracy increases as a function of 
national identification (for which meritocracy is a salient in-group norm), but not other social 
identities. 
 Fourth, previous research (Goode et al., 2014) has relied on the assumption that 
national identity increases endorsement of meritocracy because this ideology is a prototypical 
group belief system. However, national identification may also increase alternative, less 
normative economic ideologies (e.g., equality of outcomes). Although we do not expect such 
an effect, the existing data have not addressed this possibility. 
 Finally, the studies thus far have not tested whether a compensatory increase in 
meritocracy endorsement is an effective method of restoring personal control. While we 
found that individuals showed an increase in identification and meritocracy (as a function of 
that identification), evidence that endorsing meritocracy actually increases participants’ 
feelings of control would be valuable. Although this prediction is not commonly addressed in 
research on compensatory control, with Study 3 we sought to directly test the effectiveness of 
compensation on control restoration.  
Study 3 
 Study 3 was designed to address our theoretical account while ruling out alternatives. 
First, we tested whether threats to personal control related to one’s membership in a social 
group can increase identification with that group specifically, and not simply any salient 
group. To test this prediction, we randomly assigned participants to the same group-based 
control threat (vs. neutral) conditions used in the previous studies and then assessed their 
level of identification with Americans as well as alternative social group identities (e.g., 
gender, religious group).  
 According to our argument, any compensatory increase in meritocracy as a result of a 
group-based control threat would be due to an increase in national identification, because this 
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ideology is a central group norm for Americans. While the previous studies supported that 
contention, Study 3 goes beyond these studies by testing whether national identification 
specifically (vs. other group identities) accounts for this increase in meritocracy. We tested 
this possibility using multiple mediation analysis (Hayes, 2012), which allows us to test 
competing mediators simultaneously. We expected that national identification, but not other 
group identities, would account for increased meritocracy endorsement. 
 Additionally, we expected that national identification would increase meritocracy, but 
it would not increase other, non-normative, economic ideologies. In order to compare 
meritocracy to other ideologies, we included an assessment of egalitarianism (i.e., valuing 
equality of outcomes) after measuring identification with national and other groups. We 
expected that increased national identification would subsequently increase endorsement of 
meritocracy (as we found in the previous studies) but not egalitarianism. 
 Finally, participants completed a measure of perceived personal control at the end of 
the study to assess the degree to which meritocracy endorsement in response to a group-based 
control threat resulted in increased feelings of personal control. By measuring each of these 
constructs, a full test of our process argument was possible. Specifically, we expected a threat 
to personal control based upon being an American to increase meritocracy through national 
identification and that this process would subsequently restore feelings of personal control. 
We tested this full model using a sequential mediation analysis that tested for an indirect 
effect of condition on perceived personal control as a function of national identification 
(mediator 1) and meritocracy endorsement (mediator 2; Hayes, 2013). We also compared this 
sequential mediation model to alternative models to test the validity of our account of the 
relationships between these outcomes.  
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Method 
Participants. All participants completed all study materials and our sample consisted 
of 121 (55 women and one non-response) U.S. residents. Participants completed the study via 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk for a small financial incentive ($0.40). The sample ranged in age 
from 19 to 68 (M = 35.42, SD = 13.84). The majority of participants (71.7%) indicated their 
ethnicity as White; 13.2% as Black; 9.1% as Asian; 3.3% as Latino(a); and 2.5% did not 
respond to the ethnicity question.  
Group-based control threat. Participants were randomly assigned to view either the 
group-based control threat or the neutral manipulation from the previous studies.  
Group identification. Each participant filled out measures assessing their 
identification with the 1) nation, 2) their gender group, and 3) their religious group. The order 
of presentation of these identification measures was counterbalanced to control for order 
effects. Each identity measure consisted of 6 items modified from the identity subscale of the 
collective self-esteem scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) and were worded the same with only 
the social group changing across measures. For example, “Being an American [woman/man; 
member of my religious group] is an important reflection of who I am.” These items formed 
reliable identification scales (national identification α = .95; gender identification α = .96; 
religious group identification α = .93) and scores on the items for each group were averaged. 
Ideological endorsement. Each participant filled out measures of both meritocracy 
and egalitarianism (framed as a belief in equality of outcomes) with order of presentation 
counterbalanced. Meritocracy was measured using the same 6 items from Studies 1b and 2. 
These items formed a reliable composite (α = .92). Egalitarianism was measured using 6 
items from both the egalitarianism and inegalitarianism scale (Klugel & Smith, 1986) and the 
American national election studies egalitarianism scale (Feldman, 1988). For example, 
“There should be more focus on equality of outcomes in today's society;” “If people were 
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treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems;” “Incomes should 
be more equal, because everybody’s contribution to society is equally important.” These 
items formed a reliable egalitarianism scale (α = .88). 
Perceived personal control. Perceived personal control was measured using the 
same 6 items from Study 1a. These items formed a reliable composite (α = .89) and scores 
were averaged. See Table 2 for a complete list of correlations among the measures. 
Results 
Group Identification 
 See Table 2 for a complete list of descriptives and correlations amongst variables. A 
MANOVA was conducted to assess the multivariate effect of condition on group identity. 
Results indicated a significant effect, F(3, 116) = 4.29, p = .007, Wilk’s Λ = .90. Each 
identification measure was then subjected to a one-way ANOVA to determine the impact of 
condition. For national identification, the analysis revealed a significant effect, F(1, 119) = 
11.49, p = .001, η² = .09, with participants in the group-based control threat condition 
indicating higher levels of national identification (M = 4.77, SD = 1.34) than participants in 
the neutral condition (M = 3.81, SD = 1.76). There was not a significant effect of condition 
on gender identification, F(1, 119) = 0.47, p = .50; participants in the group-based control 
threat condition reported similar levels of gender identification (M = 5.32, SD = 1.46) as 
participants in the neutral condition (M = 5.14, SD = 1.55). There was also no significant 
effect of condition on religious group identification, F(1, 119) = 0.50, p = .82; those in the 
group-based control threat condition reported similar levels of religious identification (M = 
3.85, SD = 1.96) as participants in the neutral condition (M = 3.93, SD = 2.04).  
Ideological Endorsement 
 A MANOVA analysis was conducted to determine the multivariate effect of condition 
on ideology endorsement. Results indicated a significant effect, F(2, 118) = 4.81, p = .01, 
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Wilk’s Λ = .93. Each ideology measure was then subjected to a one-way ANOVA to assess 
the effect of condition. For meritocracy, the analysis revealed a significant effect, F(1, 119) = 
9.11, p = .003, η² = .07, with participants in the group-based control threat condition 
endorsing higher levels of meritocracy (M = 4.51, SD = 1.41) compared to participants in the 
neutral condition (M = 3.72, SD = 1.46).  
 We next examined our prediction that national (vs. alternative) identification would 
account for this compensatory increase in meritocracy endorsement. To test this, we 
conducted a multiple mediation analysis of the effect of condition on meritocracy with the 
three measured identities treated as potential mediators. The results indicated that national 
identification mediated the effect of condition on meritocracy, indirect effect = 0.34, SE = 
0.14, 95% CI =.14, .68, but that gender identification, indirect effect = 0.006, SE = 0.03, 95% 
CI = -.04, .22, and religious identification, indirect effect = -0.03, SE = 0.05, 95% CI = -.18, 
.10, did not.  
 In contrast, we observed no effect of condition on egalitarianism, F(1, 119) = 0.16, p 
= .69.  Participants in the group-based control threat condition (M = 4.84, SD = 1.49) did not 
significantly differ from participants in the neutral condition (M = 4.95, SD = 1.38). 
Furthermore, egalitarianism was negatively correlated with national identification, r = -.25, p 
= .007, and unrelated to both gender identification, r = -.007, p = .94, and religious 
identification, r = -.085, p = .36.
3
  
Personal Control 
 Finally, we tested whether increased meritocracy as a function of national 
identification would subsequently increase perceived personal control. First, we found that 
perceived personal control was higher for those participants in the group-based control 
                                                 
3 Due to men’s high status position within the U.S. and the fact that meritocracy can work to legitimize 
that status (Jackman, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) it may be that greater endorsement of meritocracy in the 
threat condition was driven by men’s identification with that group. The results did not support this view; 
specifically, gender did not moderate the effect of experimental condition on national identification, p = .40; 
meritocracy, p = .63; or personal control, p = .51.  
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threat condition (M = 5.10, SD = 1.20) compared to the neutral condition (M = 4.42, SD = 
1.19; F(1, 119) = 8.20, p = .005, η² = .06). Was compensatory meritocracy endorsement 
responsible for this difference? To address this question, we conducted a sequential 
mediation analysis testing whether the observed mediation model in which the threat to 
group-based control manipulation increased meritocracy as a function of national 
identification led to a subsequent indirect effect on feelings of personal control. In other 
words, we expected the effect of the group-based control threat on perceived personal 
control to be a function of increased national identification (M1) and increased meritocracy 
(M2).  
Mediation by National Identification and Meritocracy in Sequence 
Using model 6 of the PROCESS macro for SPSS (ten-thousand bootstrapped 
resamples; Hayes, 2013) we regressed perceived personal control onto condition (dummy 
coded: neutral = 0 and group-based control threat = 1) and entered national identification 
and meritocracy as sequential mediators. As seen in Figure 3, the group-based control threat 
increased national identification, which in turn increased meritocracy. The sequential indirect 
effect of condition on perceived personal control through national identification and 
meritocracy was significant, indirect effect = 0.14, SE = 0.06, 95% CI = .05, .31. 
Furthermore, the two simple mediation pathways, one testing national identification as the 
sole mediator (indirect effect = -0.004, SE = 0.07, 95% CI = -.13, .16) and the other testing 
meritocracy as the sole mediator (indirect effect = 0.19, SE = 0.12, 95% CI = -.02, .47), were 
not significant in the multivariate model. Switching the sequence of mediators in the model 
so that meritocracy preceded national identification also resulted in a non-significant model, 
indirect effect = -0.001, SE = 0.03, 95% CI = -.05, .06. 
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Discussion 
 Study 3 provided clear support for our predictions. We observed, as our theorizing 
predicts, that a threat to personal control based upon membership in the group Americans 
resulted in an increased identification with this group specifically (but not other group 
identities). Additionally, this increase in group identification has unique implications for 
ideology: participants in the group-based control threat (vs. neutral) condition demonstrated a 
marked increase in meritocracy endorsement and this effect was due specifically to increased 
national identification. Indeed, we saw that the effects of the group-based control threat on 
ideological endorsement were group-specific: participants increased endorsement of group 
normative, meritocratic ideology, but not counter-normative egalitarian ideology.  
This study provides the first evidence that compensatory endorsement of meritocracy 
increases feelings of personal control. While other research on compensatory control has 
shown that control threat leads to increased endorsement of external systems or beliefs, our 
research explains why people endorse such beliefs (identification) and provides a clear 
demonstration of the effectiveness of this compensatory endorsement by demonstrating its 
consequences for restoration of personal control.   
General Discussion 
 We provide the first examination of how individuals can manage a group-based threat 
to personal control. In Study 1a we established that a threat to control based upon group 
membership lowers perceptions of personal control. We then showed that our group-based 
threat to control uniquely undermined personal control, but not self-certainty or collective 
self-esteem, and that this manipulation also increased levels of identification with the specific 
threatened group (Study 1b). We next showed that increased adherence to a group normative 
ideology after a group-based threat to personal control stems specifically from increased 
identification with the group (Study 2). In Study 3 we found that participants did not increase 
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identification with any social group presented to them, nor did they increase adherence to any 
ideology. As predicted, we found that participants effectively reestablished a sense of 
personal control through identification and ideological endorsement specific to the group that 
was the source of a group-based control threat. These effects place social identity and self-
categorization processes at the core of compensatory processes involved in maintaining 
personal control.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
While the results of these studies are compelling, there are important limitations that 
should be addressed in future research. In Study 1b we failed to find direct evidence that the 
effect of our manipulation on national identification could be accounted for through 
perceived personal control, thus we cannot confirm the role of personal control in fully 
explaining the effect of threat on identification. While our theoretical argument proposes that 
threatened control is the cause of identification, and identification the cause of ideology 
endorsement, our data suggest that the relationships may be more complex. We did find that 
the group-based control threat decreased personal control and increased identification (Study 
1b), however perceived personal control was positively associated with identification in both 
experimental conditions (replicating prior research; Greenaway et al., 2015). It is possible 
that a more complex longitudinal model would be necessary to disentangle the roles of 
personal control and identification. One way to achieve a test of this question would be to test 
whether the association between control and group identification is different before (vs. after) 
the experience of a control threat. On the basis of past research, we would anticipate that 
prior to (or in the absence of) any threat, these variables will be highly correlated. In contrast, 
we might expect that following a threat, those individuals who experience a high degree of 
threat will show a dramatic increase in group identification. This would weaken the 
relationship between the two variables by shifting identification scores up among low control 
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participants. It may even result in a quadratic distribution with the highest identification 
scores at both the low and high ends of the distribution of control scores. Unfortunately, the 
current studies do not allow for a full test of this possibility, and it is somewhat at odds with 
the more simplistic mediational account tested in Study 1b. 
 Another possibility is that that we are simply mistaken in our assumption that a loss of 
control drives the effects we have observed in the present studies. While the current studies 
broadly support our account, it is plausible that some other variable is driving the effects of 
our threat manipulation on identification and ideology endorsement. While Study 1b suggests 
that this variable is unlikely to be self-certainty or collective self-esteem, the effects of our 
group-based control threat prime may extend to other variables, such as feelings of 
uncertainty about the future or the perception that a valued ingroup is the victim of some 
injustice. If these variables are the proximal explanation for the effects of prime on 
identification, then our observation of increased personal control following ideological 
endorsement (Study 3) might actually be a secondary effect rather than evidence of a control 
compensation process.  
 We have argued in this paper that the target of the group-based threat (e.g., 
Americans) directly increased identification with that group and in turn dictated the ideology 
endorsed as a source of compensation. However, because each study used a threat to the same 
group (i.e., Americans) in the same context (economics), we cannot rule out the possibility 
that participants increased their identification with the nation because meritocracy is 
associated with America and this is the most useful ideology to deal with economic threat. 
We have relied on a SIT/SCT framework that predicts that a threat to a specific group will 
lead to increased identification with that group, and as such a greater adherence to the group’s 
beliefs (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 
2001; Turner, Hogg, Turner, & Smith, 1984). However, work within CCT has shown that 
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threats to personal control at an individual (vs. group-based) level can increase adherence to 
ideology (Friesen, Kay, Eibach, & Galinsky, 2014; Goode et al., 2014). Therefore we cannot 
rule out the possibility that a threat to a different social group such as college students, based 
upon their economic future, might not also increase identification with Americans and 
adherence to meritocracy. In other words, it may be that the need to deal with a threat to 
one’s personal economic future dictates the group (and ideology) for compensation, rather 
than the group targeted in the threat itself. Future work will need to more thoroughly parse 
out the relationship between the group implicated in the threat, and the group and ideology 
chosen as sources of compensatory control.  
We also did not investigate potential moderation effects of identification on how 
group members experience and respond to personal control threats that are based upon their 
social group. While we observed a reliable main effect of threat condition on group 
identification, had we measured identification before the threat we might have seen 
differences between those who highly identify with the group Americans and those who do 
not. For example, defensively increasing group identification after a threat is more typical of 
highly identified group members rather than lowly identified group members. Those group 
members who do not initially value their social identity often distance themselves from the 
group and its norms following a threat (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999), and 
instead embrace social mobility beliefs as a means to compensate (Wright, Taylor, & 
Moghaddam, 1990). It may be that our results are driven by those participants who came into 
the study with a relatively positive view of their group (Americans) rather than indicating that 
all group members will respond by compensating with a group normative ideology. 
Nonetheless, having found substantial support for the threat-compensation-restoration 
process, future research can now address how differences in initial identification with a group 
affect both identification and ideological endorsement following a group-based control threat.  
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 Another limitation to these studies concerns our choice of social group. The 
population of the U.S. is diverse and definitions of what it means to be American are likely to 
differ between different subgroups based upon ethnicity, gender, social class, so on (Sidanius 
& Pratto, 1999). Our theorizing assumes that identification with Americans increases 
endorsement of meritocracy based on the evidence that this ideology is normative in the U.S. 
However, different conceptions of the group may create unexplored variability in the 
ideologies people endorse in the wake of a group-based control threat. The majority of our 
sample population was White, and as a socially dominant group, Whites may feel both a 
greater ownership over the identity Americans (Molina, Phillips, & Sidanius, 2014; Sidanius 
& Petrocik, 2001) and may adhere to status quo enhancing beliefs like meritocracy more so 
than other ethnic groups within the United States (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). While we believe 
that group-based control threats will generally increase identification and ideology 
endorsement, future research will be needed to extend this account to social identities that 
represent disenfranchised groups (e.g., women, Blacks) with potentially different normative 
ideologies.  
 Finally, while we observed increased endorsement of ideological beliefs following a 
threat to personal control, we did not measure any attitudes or behaviors directed at 
outgroups. This is an important question as previous work has shown that when the self is 
threatened based on group membership, group members may increase warmth and positive 
regard for one’s ingroup and/or derogate outgroup members as a way of assuaging the threat 
(Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Huo & Molina, 2006). For instance when members 
of high status social groups experience threat based upon group membership, they may 
perceive the threat as coming from low status groups (Danbold & Huo, 2014; Outten, 
Schmitt, Miller & Garcia, 2012) and respond with greater discriminatory behaviors or 
attitudes that work to assuage the threat while maintaining or increasing social inequality. 
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Because derogation of outgroups is often based upon ideological beliefs about outgroup 
members (e.g., the stereotype that Blacks suffer economic inequality because of their lack of 
effort) it is plausible that the ideology-bolstering effects of identification after a group-based 
control threat may also affect perceptions of outgroup members. 
Practical Implications 
The results from these studies provide evidence that in some cases, the way 
individuals compensate for threats to their personal control is contingent upon social identity 
processes. After a threat, individuals can affirm their commitment to the group and its 
perspective on social relations as a way to reaffirm their perceived ability to positively impact 
their social environment. Compensatory control theory has gone to great lengths testing 
which external sources people will turn to in response to threat, as well as the positive 
consequences that arise from this compensation (i.e., increased optimism over future action; 
Kay, Laurin, Fitzsimmons, & Landau, 2014). However, this theoretical perspective has 
neglected to look at how individuals compensate for group-based threats to their personal 
control, and whether those strategies are effective means of restoring perceived personal 
control.  
 We found that when individuals experience a threat to their personal control based 
upon their social group membership, individuals are drawn to the identity (and its ideologies) 
at the core of that threat. Importantly, we found that this is effective: By turning to the 
specific group and its beliefs underlying the threat, individuals effectively increased their 
perceptions of personal control.  
 While we focused primarily on this model as a point of psychological interest, the 
processes we identified likely extend to other identities and ideologies, including those that 
may further social justice. For example, in response to a group-based control threat, members 
of a union may more strongly identify with that group and strengthen their resolve to fight for 
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the union's collective interests. These possibilities speak to important connections between 
collective interests and action and individual level coping strategies which may promote or 
hinder the pursuit of those group interests.  
This possibility is particularly important with respect to low status groups. Members 
of groups that are low in social status, stigmatized, underrepresented in positions of power, 
and discriminated against may frequently experience a lack of perceived personal control due 
to the their subordinate status in society. If these group-based threats to control are met with 
beliefs that legitimize inequality, then personal control may be reaffirmed at the cost of 
maintaining unequal status relations. However, if individuals come to perceive the group-
based threats to their control as illegitimate and subject to resistance, then increased 
identification with their group may promote adherence to ideologies that challenge the status 
quo (Haslam & Reicher, 2012; Reynolds, Jones, O’Brien, & Subasic, 2013). Just as group 
membership may be the reason that individuals have their personal control threatened, it may 
also be the avenue by which they compensate while increasing their beliefs in a social system 
that no longer withholds equality (Reynolds, Haslam, & Turner, 2102). By increasing our 
understanding of when and why individuals subscribe to certain ideologies, we can also 
increase our understanding of how these ideologies can be used for social change and the 
facilitation of social action (Dixon, Tropp, Durheim, & Tredoux, 2010; Wright & Lubensky, 
2008). 
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Table 1. 
Correlations, Means and Standard Deviations of Variables, Study 1b 
 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Personal Control -    
2. Self-certainty  .55** -   
3. Collective Self-esteem .12 .001 -  
4. National Identity .21* .14 .39** - 
Mean 5.22 5.24 4.40 4.45 
Standard Deviation 0.88 0.95 1.13 1.31 
 
Note. *p <.05. **p < .01.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. 
 
Correlations, Means and Standard Deviations of Variables, Study 3 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. National Identity -      
2. Gender Identity .47** -     
3. Religious Identity .17 .18* -    
4. Meritocracy .43** .16† .19* -   
5. Egalitarianism -.24** -.007 -.08 -.45** -  
6. Personal Control  .25** .33** -.03 .49** -.08 - 
Mean 4.31 5.23 3.89 4.13 4.89 4.75 
Standard Deviation 1.62 1.50 1.99 1.48 1.44 1.24 
 
Note. †p = .08 *p <.05. **p < .01.  
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Figure 1. Indirect effect of condition on meritocracy through national identification, Study 
1b. 
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Figure 2. Indirect effect of condition on meritocracy through national identification, Study 2. 
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Figure 3. Indirect effect of condition on perceived personal control through national 
identification and meritocracy, Study 3. 
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